settlement on that is in effect taking sides 1 2 on a private contractual matter. The local 3 court will decide how much or whether he gets 4 it. but that's not а matter that the 5 Commission typically concerns itself with. 6 MR. SILVA: May I respond to that, 7 your Honor? 8 JUDGE SIPPEL: Yes. If you have --9 if you, your client, and you don't have an 10 attributable interest and the Bureau is not 11 satisfied that you've convinced the Commission 12 of that fact, that it might be, you know, 13 these things can be structured, restructured, 14 and all kinds of things can happen in those 15 kinds of trust agreement, voting trust. 16 MR. GUSKEY: Your Honor. 17 JUDGE SIPPEL: Yes, sir. 18 MR. GUSKEY: This is Mr. Guskey. I 19 need to interject something here that's quite 20 relevant. Much of the dialogue, you know, 21 from Mr. Silva is complaining that the FCC has 22 imposed conditions regarding Mr. Waugh's stock

ownership and attributable interest ship in the form of that, but the bottom line is we actually never get to the final decision as far as the FCC regarding Mr. Waugh because before one gets to the matter as far as the FCC's final decision on things, the company has stepped forward and clearly documented and described and communicated position to Mr. Waugh that it had decided it will not give him stock.

You know, so the court, you know, can entertain all the conversations and dialogue between the EB and Mr. Silva regarding their points of view regarding whether or not the FCC has any standing to have any input into that environment, but we never get to that point because the company has decided that it --

JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, the company -if there's been -- I don't want to, you know,
take this down the road, but, kick the can
down the road, if the company has made that

decision and Mr. Waugh has a contractual right 1 2 to stop he feels, what's to prevent him from 3 going into court, a state court, and have that 4 adjudicated. And the court will perhaps issue 5 a specific performance if Mr. Waugh convinces 6 them of his position. 7 GUSKEY: Absolutely nothing, MR. 8 your Honor. And we made that argument in our, 9 in Preferred's settlement fact statement that 10 those avenues exist for Mr. Waugh. Mr. 11 Waugh's contention was that he was being 12 deprived of certain rights. 13 I vehemently disagree with that 14 phrasing. The reality is this is about claim. 15 He has a claim to, to compensation from the 16 company, whether it be monetary or in the form 17 of stocks, it is a claim. 18 His claim has not been affected by 19 this proceeding one way or another. You know, and I think it's very telling that he has not taking this issue to a court. Again, humble opinion is, you know, he hasn't taken

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1 this to a court because he doesn't believe he 2 will prevail. 3 And separate from whether that is, you know, again, my personal opinion, one 4 5 thing that is very disturbing for Preferred is 6 that that Mr. Waugh has chosen this time and 7 place to draw a line and we believe he is 8 using undue influence, i.e., his signature on 9 a universal agreement to force the company 10 into compensating him in an amount and in a 11 form that it otherwise would not do. 12 JUDGE SIPPEL: Now, are you 13 referring to the agreement that disposes of 14 this case or this other agreement that was 15 mentioned going back into June of 2009? MR. GUSKEY: I'm referring to Mr. 16 17 Waugh's position --18 JUDGE SIPPEL: July --19 MR. GUSKEY: -- in this proceeding, 20 this proceeding, which was led to the 21 settlement agreement signed by the EB 22 Preferred.

1 JUDGE SIPPEL: Okay. MR. GUSKEY: And that his refusal 2 3 to, we believe in good faith, participate in 4 - that is because he sees that he has this 5 leverage to hold the company hostage because 6 he knows the value to the company of resolving 7 this proceeding and being able to move 8 forward. And that's one of the reasons that 9 10 this is very emotional. It's very 11 contentious. There are a lot of people 12 involved with this. I don't if your Honor has 13 seen it as yet, but just yesterday, a group of 14 investors, they indicate that they represent 15 0.3 in total, filed in of the support 16 settlement agreement, i.e., the one that the 17 Enforcement Bureau and Preferred has signed. 18 JUDGE SIPPEL: I didn't see that. 19 I saw that there was a -- does that have to do 20 with the withdrawal of the appeal? 21 MR. GUSKEY: No, sir. There's 22 actually two groups of investors. One is 1ed

1	by or named by a Mr. Michael Judy.
2	JUDGE SIPPEL: Mr. Judy, yes.
3	MR. GUSKEY: Yes. And the other
4	group who, and, you know, I know that this is
5	very complicated and you need a scorecard to
6	keep track of things, but one of the things
7	that is in play in this situation is legally
8	that Mr. Judy is acting in consort with Mr.
9	Waugh to attempt to take control of the
10	company for their own benefit and personal
11	interest, which would be detrimental to the
12	remainder of the shareholders.
12	I Chia i i de la como
13	MR. SILVA: Your Honor, you know, I
13	MR. SILVA: Your Honor, you know, I
13	MR. SILVA: Your Honor, you know, I think we're getting a little far off field
13 14 15	MR. SILVA: Your Honor, you know, I think we're getting a little far off field here.
13 14 15 16	MR. SILVA: Your Honor, you know, I think we're getting a little far off field here. JUDGE SIPPEL: Hold on just a
13 14 15 16 17	MR. SILVA: Your Honor, you know, I think we're getting a little far off field here. JUDGE SIPPEL: Hold on just a second.
13 14 15 16 17 18	MR. SILVA: Your Honor, you know, I think we're getting a little far off field here. JUDGE SIPPEL: Hold on just a second. MR. OSHINSKY: We need to observe
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR. SILVA: Your Honor, you know, I think we're getting a little far off field here. JUDGE SIPPEL: Hold on just a second. MR. OSHINSKY: We need to observe some decorum. If Mr. Guskey is finished then

1 why we took a ten-minute break, not because we 2 had to take a break, but because it was 3 getting too hot in here. This is getting too 4 heated. Just keep it down. 5 all right, Now, so okay, SO 6 there's allegations around something like 7 that, I think, in consort with Mr. Waugh. 8 Look, I can't get into that and -- get to the 9 point. Get to, get to the bottom of what 10 you're trying to say. 11 MR. GUSKEY: Well, the bottom-line, 12 your Honor, is the company has made a 13 decision, you know, to not issue stock to Mr. 14 Waugh, so that is, that is not going to 15 change. 16 JUDGE SIPPEL: A11 right. The 17 Bureau doesn't -- and the Bureau doesn't him 18 to get the stock either because it complicates 19 the settlement too much. 20 MS. SINGH: Your Honor, if I may 21 clarify. Before the break, I was cut off in 22 trying to defend the Bureau's position.

Bureau understands that Mr. Waugh frames this as a contractual dispute that's outside of the purview of this settlement, but at the same time, in the July 8, 2009 letter that the Bureau provided you a copy of, he also requested that the settlement agreement if it was to be universal include resolution of the voting trust and stock that he claims is outside of this proceeding.

So to the Bureau, we saw that position statement, we reacted to it during the July 8, 2009 conference call, we invited Mr. Waugh through his counsel on July 31, 2009 to see if he had changed his position in any respect, he had not. We told him that if we were to settle this case before the next deadline before your Honor, which is August 11, 2009 at the time, that we would have to settle without him because of this position in consistency between what Preferred wanted the settlement to include and what Mr. Waugh wanted the settlement to include. And I would

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1	like to add that the Enforcement Bureau's
2	position is entirely consistent with what Mr.
3	Guskey just told you.
4	MR. SILVA: Your Honor, could I
5	comment on that because there is some
6	misunderstanding here. The Bureau has from
7	the very beginning insisted that there would
8	not be a universal settlement unless Mr. Waugh
9	agreed to forego his claim. That is is
10	that not true?
11	MS. SINGH: That is incorrect, your
12	Honor.
13	MR. OSHINSKY: No, that is not
14	true. It is the form of compensation we're
15	arguing about and nothing else, just the form
16	of the compensation. Not that there might be
17	compensation owed, but simply the form that it
18	takes and that is all.
19	MR. SILVA: Well, okay.
20	MR. OSHINSKY: That's the
21	distinction you keep riding over.
22	MR. SILVA: Well, all right, your

1	Honor. I mean, but the point was they said he
2	could not have stock. The stock could not go
3	to the voting trust, which is the original
4	agreement
5	JUDGE SIPPEL: There is an
6	enforcement interest though in having people
7	who are disqualified by a character
8	disqualification not having, not having stock
9	in a company.
10	MR. SILVA: But he, he was it
11	would be held by the trust, a nonvoting, non-
12	attributable interest, which he is entitled
13	to. I mean
14	JUDGE SIPPEL: But I heard Ms.
15	Singh say that now, wait a minute. I heard
16	Ms. Singh say that, well, it's a five-year
17	it's a five-year trust. It's not in
18	perpetuity.
19	MR. SILVA: Well, look, if there's
20	a problem with the details of the trust
21	agreement, I mean, that's certain
22	JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, I that's

1	MR. SILVA: Well, it the trust
2	agreement was extended for an additional five
3	years. And, you know, the point is, as Mr.
4	Guskey has pointed out, the this trust
5	agreement is somewhat in limbo.
6	I mean, it's never been signed.
. 7	It's just been there. And the parties are
8	still trying to resolve this. But my point
9	is, why is the Bureau insisting that he, that
10	Mr. Waugh not get stock? It has really
11	JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, I think I just
12	paraphrased it, but I'll ask Ms. Singh to say
13	it again or
14	MR. SILVA: Well, let me
15	JUDGE SIPPEL: Let her, let her
16	give her position.
17	MR. SILVA: All right. Well, I've
18	heard it, but the point is there's this
19	appearance that it was a sham, but they know
20	that it wasn't a sham now. They know that
21	there was no unauthorized transfer of control.
22	They know that Waugh didn't assume control and

1	that Austin didn't relinquish control.
2	So why is this requirement on
3	settlement there? Why is it there? I mean,
4	why is-Waugh being punished? Is it just
5	because of the appearance, some kind of
6	misconduct? He didn't do anything wrong.
7	JUDGE SIPPEL: All right. Let me,
8	let me hear with the Bureau says. Go ahead.
9	MS. SINGH: The presiding judge
10	aptly stated our position.
11	JUDGE SIPPEL: I'm sorry.
12	MR. SILVA: The presiding judge,
13	your Honor, you aptly stated our position.
14	JUDGE SIPPEL: You can't so far
15	there hasn't been a structure presented to you
16	that you can trust that is going to be
17	ironclad that's going to keep Mr. Waugh out
18	from becoming, somehow becoming a stockholder
19	or having owning rights or having control
20	rights or something with the company.
21	MS. SINGH: That is correct. And
22	it's not just the form of the individual

voting trust. It is the idea that all together -- because, as the Bureau described to your Honor earlier today, it existence of the voting trust in combination with the existence of other documents that the stock was issued to that voting trust described in the order to show cause in combination with Mr. Waugh's past role as a consultant with company the and his involvement with its day-to-day affairs that in combination prompted this hearing to be designated.

The Bureau considered it serious enough that it proposed as a penalty forfeitures and revocation of the company's licenses this, in part due to these allegations. And thus it is the Bureau's position that to present to us a form on which we would sign off that puts Mr. Waugh in a better position than he was at the start of proceeding if you believe his, statements on the record that the stock was

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never issued to him, that the voting trust was never created. That's intolerable to the Bureau.

JUDGE SIPPEL: But that's -- yes, but you're saying that these are your allegations. Now, Mr. Silva is saying, you cut him out and he gets -- he perceives it this way, Mr. Waugh gets cut out of this agreement and he's sitting out there like a duck with these allegations against him that haven't been resolved.

MS. SINGH: Well, your Honor, the form for those allegations if proper settlement agreement approval were to reinstated in this proceeding is the time at which Mr. Waugh holds sufficient interest that he can come before the Commission as applicant licensee permit or holder of Section 214 operating authority. Something over which the Commission has jurisdiction and in which Mr. Waugh has a sufficient enough interest that his licensee qualifications can

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1	decided at that time.
2	It is the Bureau's position that
3	if a settlement agreement were approved in
4	this case in the form that has been presented
5	to your Honor
6	JUDGE SIPPEL: Yes.
7	MS. SINGH: then Mr. Waugh would
8	no longer hold such an interest and thus any
9	determination of his licensee character
10	qualifications would effectively take place in
11	a vacuum without an application permit or
12	operating authority or license to which that
13	character qualification could detach, attach.
14	MR. SILVA: Your Honor, we filed a
15	motion for summary decision.
16	JUDGE SIPPEL: You did?
17	MR. SILVA: And obviously the
18	parties haven't commented on it, and I'm not
19	asking them to today,
20	JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, that go
21	ahead.
22	MR. SILVA: but from our

1	standpoint, that resolves the case without a
2	hearing. It's a more honest and direct
3	approach and all it does is it says, look,
4	there was no unauthorized transfer of control,
5	there was nothing to hide and nothing was
6	hidden, and the issues, there's no genuine
7	issue of fact, so resolve the case without a
8	hearing.
9	MS. SINGH: Your Honor, if I may.
10	JUDGE SIPPEL: Yes, of course.
11	MS. SINGH: The Bureau's position
12	is that its commitments in terms of a
13	settlement agreement are not to be taken part
14	and parcel as its hearing position, and
15	therefore, the Bureau at this time cannot
16	comment on whether it would be in its interest
17	to resolve this case through the motion for
18	summary judgment teed-up by Mr. Waugh.
19	JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, I understand
20	that and there was right in reserve by the
21	Bureau to file a detailed, a more detailed
22	opposition to the motion if that, if it came

1 down to that. Just hearing what you're saying 2 though that there's allegations of a, of a, 3 you say that there have actually been stock 4 transfers made or there's been stock transfers 5 into this trust that the allegation that your 6 -- and am I right? Is that what you're 7 alleging? 8 Essentially, MS. SINGH: vour 9 Honor, the order to show cause describes what 10 you're describing --11 JUDGE SIPPEL: All right. MS. SINGH: -- that there is record 12 13 evidence suggesting that a voting trust was 14 created and there is a stock certificate out 15 there that issues 800,000 shares to either 16 that trust trust that is named or а 17 sufficiently like it. 18 And there is a dispute 19 whether these documents are valid. 2.0 Bureau respectfully submits that it would 21 appear that if Mr. Waugh were to seek summary 22 judgment as the vehicle to resolve this case,

it would be inappropriate for two reasons at least.

One, there would be other issues that remain outstanding that would not be covered by Mr. Waugh's motion for partial summary disposition, and two, there is a dispute as to the record evidence in this case and what it means. And the Bureau is only willing to waive the opportunity for a hearing to determine credibility findings as to what people would say about that evidence.

In the interest of a settlement agreement, which it believes is in the public interest and the best outcome for proceeding, Waugh's Mr. summary judgment motion does not accomplish any of those same objectives because it doesn't allow the company to move forward. It leaves issues pending with regard to the company that would still leave it in hearing.

It doesn't allow for any vehicle for the company to get its waiver granted

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that's currently pending in the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau. It doesn't allow a vehicle for rebanding as to the company and as to its licenses in public safety areas in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to move forward.

The settlement agreement that Preferred agreed to, that Mr. Bishop agreed to, and that the Bureau agreed to provides an avenue that is in the public interest in which the companies have agreed to, to allow all these things to move forward. Mr. Waugh's summary judgment motion at least would fail to accomplish those objections in addition to the other deficiencies that I've already noted for you.

MR. SILVA: Well, your Honor, first of all, Mr. Waugh had nothing to do with that issuance of the stock that counsel has referred to. And I think the depositions of both Mr. Austin and Mr. Waugh have made that perfectly clear unless the Bureau has some

other evidence. But Mr. Waugh had nothing to do with that and it's not really relevant to this whole discussion.

I mean the issue in this case is whether or not there was an unauthorized transfer of control and the motive behind this unauthorized transfer of control was to hide the fact that Mr. Waugh was the beneficiary of a voting trust. And I think the record has shown so far that there was no transfer of control, and moreover, the motive doesn't exist because there wasn't any requirement that Preferred disclosed who beneficiaries of voting trust were.

So my point is, my client really hasn't done anything wrong here despite the appearance that the, that the counsel keeps making reference to. There wasn't anything wrong with setting up a voting trust. There wasn't any unauthorized transfer of control. My client didn't do anything wrong. In fact, Preferred didn't do anything wrong.

They didn't advocate control. So
why isn't summary decision the best way? Now,
my summary decision was partial, I don't
represent Mr. Bishop, I don't represent
Preferred. I submitted a motion for summary
decision on behalf of my client.
JUDGE SIPPEL: I understand. I
understand.
MR. SILVA: It doesn't it
doesn't suffer from the malady that this
settlement agreement does. Number one, it
doesn't prejudge Mr. Waugh's involvement or
how much not his involvement, but his
interest in the company, which is apparently
everyone concedes, a civil matter.
So what would the Bureau do if we
just eliminated that one clause from their
settlement agreement? Would that be agreeable
to them? Apparently not.
MS. SINGH: Your Honor
MR. SILVA: The one clause that
prohibits Mr. Waugh from getting an interest

in the company. Your suggestion I think was 1 2 very good. We leave it up to the local court. 3 He gets whatever he's entitled to by a local And he isn't prejudged. No findings 4 court. 5 are being made about whether he's qualified or not qualified, or the appearance of this 6 7 voting trust or anything else. 8 JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, the Bureau --9 MR. SILVA: That resolves the case. 10 JUDGE SIPPEL: The Bureau is --11 well, that's true and I'm trying to, 12 trying to test theories in terms of how we, 13 what road we might go down. I'm not, I'm not 14 saying that that would be an absolute --15 obviously, saying, just throwing out a phrase 16 saying, subject to a subsequent order from a 17 court of jurisdiction, you know, that sounds 18 good, but this gets to be a little bit more 19 complicated and I appreciate that. The point is, let me come down to 20 21 what I see the point to be. The point is that

there's an allegation, you've been charged in

1 the order to show cause with some kind of 2 surreptitious transfer or attempt to transfer 3 a control or voting rights in a company. 4 long as that's on the books, there's nothing 5 that the Bureau can do. 6 The Bureau cannot agree to having 7 you get stock without resolving that issue. 8 And you're saying, well, we can do it by 9 summary decision, but a wave of the hand isn't 10 going to do that. When you start getting down 11 into credibility issues and questions of who 12 did what, when, where, and why, it's very 13 difficult to go by way of summary decision. MR. SILVA: Yes, but, your Honor, -14 15 16 JUDGE SIPPEL: Usually the parties 17 -- usually on the summary -- wait a minute, 18 just a second. My experience with the summary 19 decision motion depositions incident to a 20 settlement, generally my experience has been 21 anyway that the Bureau does not object.

not a formality.

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1 I mean, there's a record made in terms of what, what the undisputed facts are, 2 3 but the facts remain to be undisputed. If the Bureau goes in and says they, you know, makes 4 5 the, take the positions that Ms. Singh is 6 taken, it's very, very difficult to issue summary decision because these fact issues 7 8 depend on credibility findings. 9 MR. SILVA: Well, as far as whether 10 or not there was an unauthorized transfer of 11 control, I don't think there's any dispute 12 between Mr. Austin and Mr. Waugh. 13 other thing about an unauthorized transfer of 14 control is you can't punish one person for 15 assuming control without punishing the other 16 one for relinguishing control. And, you know, that's the problem 17 18 really with this whole settlement. They've, 19 they've taken sides on who's at fault here. 20 When the reality is, nobody is at fault.

MS. SINGH: Your Honor, if I may, a

Nobody is at fault.

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1	few points. One, my statements to you
2	currently concerning the motion for summary
3	disposition are hypothetical and they do not
4	necessarily represent the entirety of the
5	Enforcement Bureau's position. We haven't had
6	an opportunity to comment in substance on that
7	motion.
8	I'm only pointing out certain
9	procedural defects to resolving the entire
10	case only through that motion and the Bureau
11	has not yet responded in writing, and
12	therefore, would not consider it appropriate
13	at this point to advance its entire position
14	at oral argument on that motion.
15	JUDGE SIPPEL: I'm not asking you
16	it.
17	MS. SINGH: Thank you, your Honor.
18	I'm just pointing out since counsel has in
19	effect argued on the reasoning behind this
20	motion, I would just take that opportunity to
21	point it out.

And the second thing is that, that